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Abstract
Beckett’s prose, drama, correspondence and working notes contain numerous refer-
ences to processes that pertain to unconscious, involuntary bodily functionality and
materiality. In this respect, the body’s viscera and their processes cannot properly be
said to belong to the subject, and yet everything over which we have agential control
is premised on these deeper vegetative or physiological processes; thought and feeling,
as Molloy puts it, ‘dance their sabbath’ in the ‘caverns’ of the body. If the conception
of the ‘human’ is premised on rationality, then the viscera are non-human, object-like.
Beckett’s anti-rationalist emphasis on affective, visceral experience in How It Is (along
with the novel’s veiled allusions to Pavlov’s conditioning and Watson’s behaviourism)
operates in tension with the more elevated intertextual references that signpost the
humanist tradition.
Résumé
La prose, le théâtre, la correspondance et les notes de travail de Beckett contiennent
plusieurs références aux fonctions physiologiques inconscientes du corps et à la maté-
rialité. Les viscères et leurs processus n’appartiennent pas au sujet, mais tout ce que
la conscience peut contrôler s’appuie sur ces processus végétatifs et physiologiques du
corps; la pensée et l’émotion ont leurs origines dans les organes du corps et leur fonc-
tionnement. Si le concept de “l’humain” implique la rationalité, alors les viscères sont
“non humains,” objectaux. L’accent porté par Beckett sur l’expérience viscérale, sur les
affects dans son roman, Comment c’est (ainsi que les allusions voilées au condition-
nement de Pavlov et au behaviorisme deWatson) entre en tension avec les références
intertextuelles plus nobles de la tradition humaniste.
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Much has been written in recent years about the representation of the senso-
rimotor body in Beckett’s work, but what of the un-sensed body?What should
one make of the fact that the non-visible body, the viscera—“the soft contents
of the principle cavities of the body” (OED), including the heart, brain, bowels,
lungs, as well as the nervous, endocrine and blood systems—so strikingly com-
mand Samuel Beckett’s attention? Molloy, for instance, muses on “the within,
all that inner space onenever sees, the brain andheart and other cavernswhere
thought and feelingdance their sabbath” (2009b, 6). Interiority is not conceived
here in its traditional novelistic sense as a spiritual or mental essence, iden-
tity or selfhood; rather, what is foregrounded is the starkly embodied quality of
“the within,” an “inner space” in which thought and feeling are constituted by a
specific and tangible but nonetheless unseen and often unfelt materiality. Sim-
ilarly, Beckett’s prose writings and drama, as well as his correspondence and
working notes, contain numerous references to such processes as breathing,
foetal life, birth, sleep, defecation and death—processes that pertain not to an
agential or intentional subject, but to an unconscious and involuntary bodily
functionality and materiality.
Much of Beckett’s acute interest in viscera and in involuntary bodily events
predates and anticipates key philosophical considerations of the interior of
the body in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In the first and to date most
influential philosophical analysis of embodiment, Phenomenology of Percep-
tion, published in French in 1945, Merleau-Ponty focused on the senses and
on what, since the early nineteenth-century, scientists have called “motility.”
The term includes the kinds of movements that are not perceived by the sub-
ject, including non-intentional muscular or cellular kinesis, but it is fair to say
that Merleau-Ponty’s main interest in the book is primarily in conscious, agen-
tial manifestations of movement and embodiment. Nevertheless, inTheVisible
and the Invisible—a final work that was left unfinished at his untimely death in
1961—Merleau-Ponty began to investigate and to address the unseen body.
In The Visible and the Invisible (1964), Merleau-Ponty argues that the body
is experienced as both subject and object, a “phenomenal body and an objec-
tive body,” a seer and itself visible, “a sensible sentient”, but also a body whose
phenomenal field is perpetually provisional: ‘behind, or after, or between the
aspects we see of it’ (136). Lodged between the “sensible” and the “sentient”
there is, Merleau-Ponty argues, an absence, an “abyss” (136). He makes men-
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tion of the inside of the body, “ ‘shadows stuffed with organs’ ” that belong to
the visible world (138), and yet, the organs and the processes they perform are
largely concealed from the experiencing subject. It is this bodily absence, an
exploration left unfinished at Merleau-Ponty’s death, that Drew Leder sets out
to explore in his influential book, The Absent Body (1990). As he argues, the
internal organs cannot be seenby theonewhobears themand—unlike the sur-
face of the body—they have few “sensory receptors,” such that they can barely
if at all be felt, rendering themnear-imperceptible (Leder, 37–43).Thebrain, for
instance, has no sensory receptors, and the common experience of a headache
does not originate in the organ itself but in its surrounding tissue. Feelings we
intermittently experience from other internal organs such as the stomach and
the gut have, in turn, a markedly decreased qualitative range, mostly manifest-
ing only crudely as discomfort, pain or fullness, while sensations of comfort
and pleasure are missing (Leder, 40). These crude sensations nonetheless have
a heightened “affective call” on the subject, which is characterised by com-
pulsion: they command the subject’s focus, attention and action in a manner
that is rare for agential events (Leder, 73). Even these acute instances, however,
are characterised by “spatial ambiguity,” for the paucity of sensory receptors
inside the body renders it difficult accurately to locate the origin of internal
pain (Leder, 41). And what Drew Leder terms the “motor responses” of viscera
are highly specialised, reduced in range, mostly undetectable, and, as auto-
matic or “self-moving”, they are devoid of subjective intention (46–48). And
yet, the internal organs and their processes function as “the unknown motiva-
tors” of cognitive processes, of affect and action (Leder, 37), as Beckett seems
to suggest in Molloy when he writes of “the brain and heart and other caverns
where thought and feeling dance their sabbath” (2009b, 6). The reference to
thepuritan injunctionondancingon theholy dayof rest—with its connotation
indeed of the ‘witches’ sabbath’—seems to suggest that thought and feeling are
shaped and even generated inside the body in uncontrollable and unpredictable
ways that escape order, reason, and intention.1 In this context, the etymology
of the adjective ‘visceral’ is revealing: the sixteenth-century understanding of
the word was “Affecting the viscera or bowels regarded as the seat of emotion;
pertaining to, or touching deeply, inward feelings.” (OED) Although this usage
became obsolete in the seventeenth century, it was revived in the twentieth,
possibly becausemedical discoveries in areas such as endocrinologymade this
usage no longer appear figurative to the modern understanding.
1 See OED, ‘Sabbath’, n., 3: ‘Amidnightmeeting of demons, sorcerers andwitches, presided over
by the Devil, supposed in mediæval times to have been held annually as an orgy or festival.
Often more explicitly witches’ sabbath.’
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Philosophers such as Drew Leder and Paul Ricoeur have expanded on
Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished work in The Visible and the Invisible, but some of
these ideas can also be detected, a hundred years earlier, in the writings of
the philosopher Henri Bergson, who is preoccupied in a number of his works
with what he called “the deep-seated recalcitrance of matter” (Bergson, 26).
For, as Leder has argued, internal corporeal functions “disappear not only from
[…] perception” but also from the “structure of will and action” (Leder, 45). As
such, organs that cannot directly be sensed, or that are only sensed intermit-
tently, retain for the subject the quality of an object. VirginiaWoolf recognises
this phenomenon in a letter of December 1932 to Ethel Smyth, in which she
muses: “My own brain is tome themost unaccountable of machinery—always
buzzing, humming, soaring roaring diving, and thenburied inmud” (140). Forty
years later, Mouth, the protagonist of Beckett’s play, Not I (1972), helplessly
observes “the buzzing? … yes … all the time the buzzing … dull roar like falls
… in the skull” (2009d, 92). If the working brain is sensed at all, in other words,
it is frequently as an inchoate, senseless, and unpredictably intermittent noise.
Beckett’s early interest in thework of the Swiss poet and philosopher, Henri-
Frédéric Amiel (1821–1881), may well have informed his engagement with tan-
gible, material interiority rather than spiritual essence. In his “Dream Note-
book,” which dates from the early 1930s, Beckett refers toAmiel’s encyclopaedic
method of writing: “plung[e] à la Amiel into the Encyclopaedia of my sub-
ject” (1999, 132). Amiel also appears in Beckett’s review of Thomas McGreevy’s
poetry, published in the Dublin Magazine in 1934, where he refers to “the intel-
ligent Amiel” (1983, 69). It is significant, therefore, that in his Journal Intime
(published in English translation in 1921), in an entry from August 1862, Amiel
comments on the “wise part of us” being “unconscious of itself”:
Life, which seeks its own continuance, tends to repair itself without our
help. It mends its spiders’ webswhen they have been torn; it reestablishes
in us the conditions of health, and itself heals the injuries inflicted upon
it […] The wise part of us, then, is that which is unconscious of itself; and
what is most reasonable in man are those elements in him which do not
reason. […] The essential, maternal basis of our conscious life is therefore
the unconscious life which we perceive no more than the outer hemi-
sphere of the moon perceives the earth, while all the time indissolubly
and eternally bound to it.
Amiel, 86–87
Beckett’s reference in his reviewof McGreevy’s poetry to the “intelligent Amiel”
for whom “there is only one landscape” (Disjecta 69), could therefore relate
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precisely to Amiel’s discussion of “[t]he wise part of us” and the “most reason-
able in man,” namely “those elements in him which do not reason” and which
here functions as a subtle critique of what Beckett saw as McGreevy’s overly-
conceptual, religious poetry. This valorisation of the non-rational in poetry
is echoed in Beckett’s own, earlier letter to McGreevy, dated 18 October 1932,
where he writes about “the integrity of a pendu’s emission of semen, what I
find in Homer & Dante & Racine & sometimes Rimbaud, the integrity of the
eyelids coming down before the brain knows of grit in the wind” (2009e, 134–
135). Beckett, in other words, is foregrounding automatic bodily events—here
reflex actions—as markers of what he calls “integrity”. The somatic concerns
are metonymic of literary ones, for in the same letter Beckett complains that
his own poetry is all “frigged up,” and that it is “failing to say what I imagine
I want to say,” reducing the writing to a form of “stutter[ing].” It fails not in
its “choice of terms,” but because it is “facultatif ”: optional, like intentional
actions, willed and deliberate rather than the result of a “spontaneous com-
bustion” (2009e, 133,134). The notion of ‘integrity’ also extends to the valorisa-
tion of Beckett’s literary predecessors, “Homer &Dante & Racine & sometimes
Rimbaud.” Integrity, from the Latin integritās, meaning “wholeness, entireness,
completeness, integrity, chastity, purity” (OED), both of material and moral
quality, might strike one as an odd preoccupation for Beckett, whose writing
seems to treat any conception of wholeness or purity with deep, unrelent-
ing suspicion, depending as it does on a notion of self-identity that he sees
as ineluctably unachievable, divided against itself. But ‘integrity’ also carries
the sense of something ‘unimpared’ or ‘uncorrupted,’ which may go some way
towards clarifying his sense that the representation, or even performance, of
non-intentional or not fully intentional actions contains an ‘integrity’ that con-
scious and volitional actions leave wanting.
From the 1930s, as Mark Nixon has argued, Beckett in fact explicitly asso-
ciated his writing with ‘bodily functions’ and even with excretions (23). In a
letter toMcGreevy, he refers to work sent to themagazine Experiment as “three
turds from my Central Lavatory” (Nixon, 23–24), and in a letter to Mary Man-
ning Howe, from 1936, he alludes to his oeuvre as the “Beckett Bowel Books”
(2009e, 383). By the time Beckett writes How It Is, this excremental logic has
become all-pervasive: here, the narrator muses on “the need to move on the
need to shit and vomit and the other great needs all my great categories of
being” (9).
A similar preoccupation appears in Lucky’smonologue inWaiting for Godot,
which mentions “the strides of alimentation and defecation,” as an allusion to
the theories of early twentieth-century nutritionists who devoted keen atten-
tion to the form and consistency of faeces as signs and signals from—if not
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the language itself of—the viscera (2010b, 40).2 And it crops up regularly in
other parts of Beckett’s oeuvre. Malone reminds us that “Whatmatters is to eat
and excrete. Dish and pot, dish and pot, these are the poles” (2010a, 9), in a
conception of human existence in which the in-between vanishes from view.
The scatologically-namedKrapp records onto his tapesmemories of his “bowel
condition” and his “iron stool,” which are mirrored in his constipated literary
production.3Molloy describes his birth as the “First taste of the shit” (13), which
renders his mother “Countess Caca,” and we learn that he has now taken her
place, for “I sleep in her bed. I piss and shit in her pot” (3). When asked by the
policeman for his papers, Molloy offers him “bits of newspaper, to wipemyself,
you understand, when I have a stool” (17), in an echo of the “Calypso” episode in
Joyce’sUlysses, which similarly conflateswriting or textwith excrement. Bloom
enters the outhouse and sits on “the cuckstool” to read a story from Titbits as
he excretes:
Quietly he read, restraining himself, the first column and, yielding but
resisting, began the second. Midway, his last resistance yielding, he
allowed his bowels to ease themselves quietly as he read, reading still
patiently that slight constipation of yesterday quite gone.
Joyce, 66
Reading the columns of the newspaper is conflated with the act of excreting
“columns” of faeces. His business completed, Bloom tears “away half the prize
story sharply and wipe[s] himself with it” (67).
If Beckett likened his own writing to bodily secretions, something similar is
at stake in the production of affects. Beckett’s views on the integrity of Racine’s
writing (cited above) are worth elaborating on here. Rachel Burrows, who was
Beckett’s student at Trinity College, Dublin, argued that in his teaching, Beck-
ett “loved finding little bits of what he called ‘liminal consciousness’ rather than
the subconscious, within Racine” (Gontarski, 7). “Liminal” here refers to some-
thing barely perceptible, a visceral process rather than a subconscious one, that
resides on the threshold of sensory perception. The notes on Beckett’s lectures
by Grace McKinley, another of his former students at Trinity College, Dublin
contain the following observation: “For the first time in the Fr[ench] theatrewe
2 These included Horace Fletcher (1849–1919), known as ‘the great masticator,’ who advocated
a low-protein diet, and John Harvey Kellogg, whose theories were premised on the high con-
sumption of fiber and who, with his brother, invented the corn flake.
3 See OED, ‘Crap’ (n. 1 and adj.), from the Anglo-Norman chrape for rubbish or waste, and Mid-
dle French crape, for filth and grime.
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have no heroic love. Sexuality is represented at last, and treated realistically.
None of the fine Cornelian phrases. The word hate is more frequent than love.
We have the cruelty of sexuality stated” (qtd. in Knowlson and Knowlson,
307). It is perhaps precisely these internal processes—“thought and feeling
danc[ing] their Sabbath” or what some critics have referred to as the atavis-
tic, ancestral quality of Racine’s otherwise “cerebral position” (Knowlson and
Knowlson, 311)—that Beckett was referring to in his observation about Racine:
“an interference at the heart of passion itself,” as ShaneWeller puts it (45).
The internal organs and processes of the body cannot, after all, properly be
said to “belong to the subject”; rather, they are non-human in not fully pertain-
ing to the will or to comprehension, as Drew Leder argues (65)—or as Paul
Ricoeur puts it: ‘life functions inmewithoutme’ (418). And yet, everything over
which we have agential or intentional control is premised on “deeper vegeta-
tive” or physiological processes (Leder, 65). Beckett had come across this idea
in 1934 in his reading of Max Nordau’s Degeneration (1892; tr. 1895). Nordau
himself was a physician by training, and in a chapter entitled “The Physiology
of Ego-Mania” he writes that in the case of “degenerate” subjects, “the organic
ego-sensibility, or conaesthesis,” overshadows “in great part or wholly the per-
ceptions of the externalworld in consciousness,whichno longer takesnotice of
anything but the interior processes of the organism” (256). The emotional state
that results, Nordau argues, is “the consequence of phenomena taking place
in nerves, vessels and glands” (256). Consciousness, in the emotionally degen-
erate, he continues, is therefore, “imperiously monopolized by the somatic ‘I,’
which does not permit the mind to be occupied with anything but the painful
or tumultuous processes taking place in the depths of the organs” (257). Beckett
read this passage andmade a note in his “DreamNotebook” of the “monopolis-
ing consciousness of degenerate subject distorting/excluding the Not-I” (1999,
97). As John Pilling observes, the origins of Beckett’s play, Not I (1972), can be
traced back to his reading of Nordau’s book (Beckett, 1999, 97), and signs of this
reading and understanding of subjectivity permeate most if not all of Beck-
ett’s work. As these examples suggest, the visceral can colour and saturate the
environment under conditions such as fatigue, hunger, ill health or heightened
emotional states, as Beckett had reason to know only too well.
Beckett’s writing exhibits an acute interest in visceral organs and processes,
then. The narrator of “The Calmative” (1946) is “too frightened this evening to
listen to myself rot, waiting for the great red lapses of the heart, the tearings at
the caecal walls, and for the slow killings to finish in my skull” (19).4 Similarly,
4 The caecal walls constitute part of the gut.
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Malone, who finds it difficult to “guide” his arms, muses that “[p]erhaps the red
nucleus has faded,” and comments on being “far from the sounds of blood and
breath, immured,” dying “unbeknown to my stupid flesh” (2010a, 10). “Stupid”
can here be understood as in-sensible, non-agential, and if the conception of
‘the human’ and ‘humanism’ are understood to be premised on the notion of
rationality, then the viscera are non-human precisely because they are ‘stupid,’
stunned or benumbed, as the etymology of theword suggests—in other words,
object-like, things rather than phenomena that we can experience as the sub-
ject or self.5 While this does not of course render Beckett a Cartesian writer, it
may have contributed to the early Cartesian readings of his work. In Beckett’s
writing (as in Darwin’s) after all, “thought and feeling” depend on, and even
originate in, bodily organs and their functions.
Beckett was also vitally interested in the individual organs of the body,
including especially its most complex and intricate configuration, the brain.
He read Lawrence Shainberg’s book, Brain Surgeon (1979), and commented,
in a letter to the author from July 1979, that the best chance for the writer is
in old age, “Gaping into his synaptic chasms” (2016, 506). As we know from
the discoveries made by Dirk Van Hulle and Mark Nixon in Samuel Beckett’s
Library, Beckett was a keen reader of reference books. His own copy of the
eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica—although gifted to him “too
late,” in 1958, when his more youthful interest in its volumes had waned—was
dog-eared at the entry on the “Brain” (Van Hulle and Nixon, 193). This inter-
est in “all that inner space one never sees,” continued into his final years: in
1989, after his recurring falls, he recounted to James Knowlson, in consider-
able detail and as if in an attempt to perceive the inaccessible spaces of his
own brain and body, his experience of the various neuro-physiological tests he
had had, including “encephalogram,” which measures the electrical activity of
the brain, “electromyogram,” which measures the electrical activity produced
by the skeletal muscles, and finally “posturographie,” which quantifies postural
control (Knowlson and Maude, 2012).
Molloy’s remark about the mystery of ‘thought and feeling danc[ing] their
sabbath’ in the unsensed or near-unsensed viscera also brings tomind thework
of the psychologist and pragmatist philosopher, William James, who makes
an appearance in Murphy (1938), in Neary’s comment on the ‘big blooming
buzzing confusion’ (2009f, 4), which James argued ‘assailed’ the infant through
‘eyes, ears, nose, skin, and entrails at once’ (James, 1890a, 488). In the second
volume of Principles of Psychology, James contended that perception triggers a
5 ‘Stupid’ from the Latin stupidus, ‘dazed, numbed, stunned’ (OED, ‘stupid’, adj.).
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reaction in “the skin, glands, heart, and other viscera” (1890b, 450) and that it
is in fact these reactions that we properly call emotion. James writes:
Common-sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet
a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and
strike.Thehypothesis here to bedefended says that this order of sequence
is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the
other, that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between,
and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry,
angry becausewe strike, or tremble, becausewe are sorry, angry, or fearful,
as the casemay be.Without the bodily states following on the perception,
the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colourless, destitute of
emotional warmth. We might then see the bear, and judge it best to run,
receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we should not actually
feel afraid or angry.
James, 1890b, 449–450
For James, in other words, perceptions trigger a visceral reaction in the per-
ceiver, and this involuntary, embodied impulse only later translates into a cog-
nitive realisation of grief, hatred, love, or anger. James corroborates his point by
arguing that “[i]f we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract fromour
consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have noth-
ing left behind, no ‘mind-stuff ’ out of which the emotion can be constituted”
(451; emphasis in the original). James cites the Danish psychologist Carl Georg
Lange (1834–1900) on “the physiognomy of grief”:
The chief feature of grief is perhaps its paralyzing effect on the voluntary
movements […] a feeling of weariness; and (as in all weariness) move-
ments made slowly, heavily without strength, unwillingly, and with exer-
tion […]. But this weakness of the entire voluntary motor apparatus (the
so-called apparatus of “animal life”) is only one side of the physiognomy
of grief. Another side, hardly less important, and its consequences even
more so, belongs to another subdivision of the motor apparatus, namely,
the involuntary or ‘organic’ muscles, especially those which are found in
the walls of the blood-vessels, and the use of which is, by contracting,
to diminish the latter’s calibre. These muscles, and their nerves, forming
together the “vaso-motor apparatus,” act in grief contrarily to the volun-
tary motor apparatus. Instead of being paralyzed, like the latter, the vas-
cular muscles aremore strongly contracted than usual, so that the tissues
and organs of the body become anaemic. The immediate consequence of
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this bloodlessness is pallor and shrunkenness, and the pale color and col-
lapsed features are the peculiarities which, in connection with relaxation
of the visage, give to the victim of grief his characteristic physiognomy,
and often give an impression of emaciation which ensues too rapidly to
be possibly due to real disturbance of nutrition, or waste uncompensated
by repair.
Lange qtd. in James, 1890b, 443–444
In this way, the imperceptible and undetectable within the embodied self or
the self-as-body is indirectly brought to visibility and to sensibility.The involun-
tary functioning of the viscera sets the conditions and boundaries for volitional
actions. Lange and, byproxy, James argue that emotion is a sumof physiological
processes which produce in the subject different effects, and that it is the sum
of these effects that translates into what they call emotion and what we might
call affect. In these emotions, the subject is not in control of itself; rather, “The
elements are all organic changes, and each of them is the reflex effect of the
exciting object [of perception]” (1890b, 453). As in other reflex actions, in other
words, a stimulus from the outside triggers an involuntary response, which in
turn has effects that translate into a variety of emotions. In this way, the sub-
ject is not in control of its affective responses. Instead, the object of perception
generates an affect, a possession, which in turn is processed into a conceptu-
alisation. The involuntary visceral event, triggered by the perception, remains
primary for James, while the cognitive response has a temporally secondary
status in the perceiving subject’s experience.
Paul Ricoeur takes a more nuanced stance on “affective intentionality,”
which for him entails what one might call an affective loop (271). The object
that triggers the physiological reaction—“amosaic of secretions, contractions,
etc., which recur in each emotion with only quantitative variations”—and
which “explodes in disturbance and disordered gestures,” requires a represen-
tation or conceptualisation for “intelligible emotion” to take place (270–272).
Here, the spontaneity of the involuntary reaction results in “a circular or recip-
rocal understanding between intellectual and affective evaluation and bodily
spontaneity” (272).
Beckett’s “Philosophy Notes” make brief references to various theories of
emotion, including those of the Cynics, for whom “happiness” is generated
through virtue. Beckett also speculates in his notes that the term, “cynicism,”
may have derived from the word, “Kunos,” for dog (or dog-like), which was also
the Cynics’ emblem (TCD MS 10967/66r; Beckett, 2020, 105). In Stoicism, in
turn, feelings were deemed “aberrations” (TCD MS 10967/114r; Beckett, 2020,
186). But Beckett also came across the question of affect in his reading of
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Spinoza, whose philosophy he first encountered in the early 1930s throughWil-
helm Windelband’s A History of Philosophy (1910), graduating later, in 1936, to
reading Spinoza’s Ethics in the original Latin and in French, as he notes in a let-
ter to Thomas McGreevy of 19 September 1936 (2009e, 370).6 Spinoza’s theory
of affect is succinctly summarised by Anthony Uhlmann:
In Part 3 of Spinoza’s Ethics an affect is defined as ‘the affections of the
Body by which the Body’s power of acting is increased or diminished,
aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections’
(Spinoza 1985: 493). In Part 2 of the Ethics, these affections are understood
to involve our Body’s perceptions of the contact it undergoes with other
bodies (as for example when light strikes our eyes, a sound strikes our ear
drums, something touches us, or when an image of another body occurs
to us). An affect, then, is brought about through a causal chain.
Uhlmann, 61
Uhlmann elaborates the point by saying that in Spinoza, the laws of nature
and of causation are all-encompassing, including “the humanmind andwhat it
thinks, and the human body and what it feels” (Uhlmann, 61). While Merleau-
Pontymade explicit the need to part company with the humanism, naturalism
and theology that Spinoza’s work represents, he nevertheless shares Spinoza’s
sense of a situated subject.7
1 “an odd tear inward”: How It Is
The work that perhaps most insistently and persistently returns to the vis-
cera in Beckett’s writing is How It Is (1961/1964). Édouard Magessa O’Reilly has
observed that there is a continuation in the novel of themes that are prominent
in the Trilogy, and that Beckett even briefly considered making this explicit,
adding amarginal note to the typescript linking the narrator of How It Is toMol-
loy andMalone (vii). Among the visceral organs that feature inHow It Is are the
kidney, the heart, the brain, the eye, the ear, the navel, the bladder, the urethra,
the rectum, the anus, the skin, blood, arse, testicle, genitals, “glans” [sic] (54),
6 See Matthew Feldman, Beckett’s Books: A Cultural History of Beckett’s Interwar Notes, pp. 50–
52.
7 Two months before his death, Merleau-Ponty made the following working note: ‘Precisely
what has to be done is to show that philosophy can no longer think according to this cleav-
age: God, man, creatures—which was Spinoza’s division’ (Merleau-Ponty, 274).
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and pores.8 Mingled with the heavy and at times elevated intertextual refer-
ences in the novel (recentlymasterfully explored byAnthonyCordingley), is an
extraordinary anatomical precision in which an array of body parts are singled
out: the clavicle, the skull, the right index, nail, broken column, knees, shoul-
ders, neck, heels, crown or vertex—by which the narrator refers to the cranial
vertex, an anatomical region of the head—the hands, the thenar—a group of
muscles below the thumbon the palmof the hand—forelegs, the armpit, arms,
and the humerus—the long bone of the arm between the shoulder and elbow.
Further anatomical regions foregrounded in the novel include the tongue, the
mouth, the nostrils, “dimplemalar,”—which in its adjectival form refers to any-
thing “of the cheek, belonging to the cheek,” while “malar” as a noun refers to
the bone that forms the prominent part of the cheek and outer socket (47).
“Buccinators,” which feature in Part 2 of the novel, are the muscles underlying
the cheeks (47). The references to anatomical regions of the face along with
repeated allusions to “brief movements of the lower face” (20) evoke the physi-
ology of speech, for each of these body parts plays a role in speech-production,
while the physiological emphasis on the region of the mouth brings to mind
Not I and Beckett’s comment to Alan Schneider in a letter of October 1972 that
speech in the play is “a purely buccal phenomenon without mental control or
understanding, only half heard. Function running away with organ” (Harmon,
283). How It Is, indeed, frequently insists on representing what is considered
intentional action—here speech—as involuntary, non-agential: “a fart fraught
with meaning issuing through the mouth” (20).
There is, furthermore, extraordinary attention in How It Is to involuntary,
reflexive or visceral embodied processes: breathing, panting, birth, death,
hunger, thirst, smell, sleep, defecation, copulation and other such events. The
novel also makes frequent reference to visceral secretions—“tears,” “vomit,”
“piss” and “shit”—which the mud itself resembles (16, 26, 30). The laws of
physics are evoked in the novel, such that “capillarity” (56), for example, is rep-
resented as analogous to automatic visceral reactions, emphasising the affinity
of the narrator with his environs—with what O’Reilly has termed the “primae-
valmud,” or with what the narrator himself describes as “nothingmore than all
our shit […] billions of us crawling and shitting in their shit” (44). These visceral
processes and phenomena are accompanied by affects: indifference, “love”—
theword is repeated at least sixteen times in the text—anddejection: “theheart
bleeds you lose your heart drop by drop weep even an odd tear inward” (17).
Tears, which also feature prominently in The Unnamable, are one of the “spe-
8 The skin constitutes what is called “the visceral layer.”
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cial expressions of man,” asDarwinput it (146), but “tear” is also the homograph
of another noun, a “tear” as in a “rupture,” which further adds to themateriality
and viscerality of the line that conflates emotional and physiological pain, the
heart bleeding ‘drop by drop’ an odd tear [tiɘ(r)] or tear [tɛɘ(r)] inward.
Part 1 of How It Is draws an analogy between the narrator and a dog: “the
cord round my neck the sack in my mouth a dog” (39), an animal that is fre-
quently deemed highly affective. Part 2 of the novel witnesses the appearance
of a “spinal dog” (74) which, as Beckett stated in a letter of March 1963 to the
Swedish translator of his work, C.G. Bjurström, “is not a breed of dog, but a lab-
oratory dog whose brain and nervous system are mutilated for experimental
purposes of thePavloviankind” (2014, 533). As iswell known, IvanPavlov (1899–
1936) was a brain physiologist whose work focused on conditioning and on
involuntary reflexes, signalling the arrival of food to his dogs by using bells, tun-
ing forks,metronomes and electric shocks, until these triggered a salivary gland
reflex in the animals. This reflex was measured by modifying or, better, muti-
lating the dogs’ salivary glands and collecting the secretions into a specially
constructed container attached to the gland for the purpose of the experiment.
Beckett makes several references to Pavlov’s dogs in essays, poems and corre-
spondence even before he had readWoodworth’s Contemporary Schools of Psy-
chology in the 1930s.9 The references are often humorous and even disparaging,
but theydo clearly showhow the findings of the eminentRussianbrainphysiol-
ogist captured Beckett’s imagination. Beckett’s “Psychology Notes” on “Russian
Objectivism,” furthermore, contain entries on both Pavlov’s and Bechterev’s
experiments on the “Conditioned Reflex”: “All behaviour sensorimotor, consist-
ing of stimulus-response units, each of which began with stimulus to a sense
organ& terminate inmuscular or glandular response. Behaviourmight beovert
or implicit” (TCD MS 10971/7/8r, qtd. in Maude 2013, 86).
Beckett, in other words, was interested in the visceral character of condi-
tioning, and it is therefore significant that ‘training’ features prominently in
Part 2 of How It Is, such as the remark on “problem of training and concur-
rently little by little solution and application of same” (49). Various lessons
follow: “First lesson theme song I dig my nails into his armpit right hand right
pit he cries I withdraw them thump with fist on skull his face sinks in the mud
his cries cease end of first lesson” (54). The brutality of Pavlov’s experiments
is here brought to the fore, and the sadomasochistic overtones of Part 2 also
thematise the “cruelty of sexuality” to which Beckett referred in his lectures
9 For Beckett’s interest in Pavolv and reflexes, see Maude, ‘Pavlov’s Dogs and Other Animals in
Samuel Beckett’ and Maude, “Que voulez-vous: Beckett, Nerve Theory and Literary Form.”
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on Racine (Knowlson and Knowlson, 307). The torturous lessons to which Pim
is subjected appear to be designed to elicit visceral, involuntary responses, in
the manner of the experiments on “Pavlov’s unfortunate dogs,” as Beckett had
referred to them in ‘Dante … Bruno . Vico .. Joyce’ (1929) (1983, 26). Pavlov’s
work instigated in John B. Watson, the founder of Behaviourism, the belief
that all behaviour is acquired through conditioning and conditioned learn-
ing, to which the narrator’s many “lessons” in How It Is seem to allude, for
Behaviourism andWatson’s method also make an appearance in the “Psychol-
ogy Notes” of the 1930s. Beckett observes in the notes that for Watson, the
notion of consciousness was as intangible as the concept of the soul, which
he rejected in favour of the biological (as opposed to introspective) methods
of Behaviourism (TCD MS 10971/7/8r). As Beckett knew from his reading of
Woodworth’s Contemporary Schools of Psychology (1931), Watson had experi-
ence of and admiration for animal psychology, which provided the model for
Behaviourism (Woodworth, 59; Beckett, TCD MS 10971/7/8r). Woodworth also
highlights Watson’s acknowledgement of not merely “explicit” but “implicit”
behaviour, such as “visceral behaviour” that remained “hidden in the interior”
(59), and Beckett’s ‘Psychology Notes’ indeed record that “Emotion is changes
in visceral & glandular systems” (TCD MS 10971/7r qtd. in Maude 2013, 87).
Even thinking, Woodworth adds, is for Watson a form of “implicit” behaviour,
because it was premised on what he called “inner speech,” which he argued
consisted of the near-imperceptible movement of the subject’s vocal chords
(Woodworth 61; Beckett, TCD MS 10971/7/9r).
In Part 2 of How It Is, responses are generated in somatic terms, following
a “table of basic stimuli” (59) that resemble acts of torture: “nails in armpit”
(54), “clawing his left hand to the bone” (56), can opener “between the cheeks
of his arse” (57). As Joshua Powell has argued, Beckett appears to be drawing
an analogy in the novel between methods of torture and “psychological exper-
imentation” (163). As well as recalling the muddy, often slimy trenches of the
two world wars, aspects of How It Is bring to mind laboratory conditions, for
there is a bracketing or reduction of sensory perception in the mud, where
olfactory, gustatory and visual perceptions are severely limited if not stunted,
and where touch—or its extreme form, pain—constitutes the principal focus
of training or conditioning. In this sense, Beckett’smud-crawlers resemble both
Pavlov and his dogs, experimenter and subject, perpetrator and the recipient of
extraordinary acts of cruelty. This perhaps anticipates Beckett’s final, torture-
themed play What Where (1983), in which each of the players is both torturer
and tortured in turn, and where Bim’s name is a near-homonym of Pim.
Beckett’s often extreme representations of affective processes in How It Is
could perhaps be understood in terms of Spinoza’s claim that any knowledge
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we have of the outside world consists only of “a knowledge of ourselves, and of
how we have been affected” by it, but which therefore fails to provide “a clear
idea of the thing we perceive” (Uhlmann, 62). And yet, as Anthony Uhlmann
points out, we might see this rather differently and say that in so much as we
understand ourselves, we do so “through the contact we make with other bod-
ies” such that “Our very thought […] is determined from theoutside” (Uhlmann,
62). It is perhaps this anti-rationalist emphasis on affective, visceral experi-
ence in How It Is that explains the novel’s frequent allusions to “loss of species”
(21). In Part 1, the narrator’s reference to “hanging on by the fingernails to one’s
species” (20) along with veiled allusions to the work of Pavlov, Bechterev, and
Watson in the novel seem to operate in tension with the more elevated inter-
textual references that signpost the humanist tradition, representing instead
forms of existence that bear a closer resemblance to the non-human animal.
Molloy’s formulation of “the brain and heart and other caverns where thought
and feeling dance their sabbath” (6) points to a creature whose subjectivity
appears in a much starker, minimally-agential hue, to a creature that has shed
almost all vestiges and signs of its humanising qualities.
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